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II. ARGUMENT IN REPLY 
A. Mr. Folk Challenged the Relevance of the Nightmare Hearsay Below 
Mr. Folk argued in the district court and in his Opening Brief that testimony from Ms. 
Reed that T.R. told her that he had just had a nightmare about "what that bad guy did to me last 
night" and identifying Mr. Folk as the bad guy should be excluded because it was not relevant. R 
Vol. I, pp. 67-72, 100-102; Tr. 11115111, p. 108, In. 19 - p. 109, In. 12; Appellant's Opening 
Briefpp.9-19. In response, the State argues that any challenge to the relevance of the hearsay 
statements made after the nightmare was not preserved for appellate review. Respondent's Brief 
at page 8. The record rebuts this argument. 
Mr. Folk's motion to exclude the hearsay was based on relevance: "The defense moves 
the court to exclude the testimony of why the mother, Charity Reed, called the police, in order to 
prevent erroneous admission of irrelevant testimony." R Vol. I, p. 67 (emphasis added). Mr. 
Folk then set out verbatim IRE 401 defining relevant evidence and IRE 402 excluding irrelevant 
evidence. R Vol. I, p. 69. Mr. Folk then explained, "These statements of the mother [repeating 
T.R. 's hearsay about the content of his nightmare] are not going to be helpful to the jury in 
deciding what is the guilt or innocence of the defendant." R Vol. I, p. 70. Mr. Folk's motion 
concluded that the hearsay would be "irrelevant evidence under IRE 402, [it] should be 
excluded." R Vol. I, p. 7l. 
In the State's response in the district court to Mr. Folk's motion, it recognized that 
relevance was the issue - it argued, "The Defendant in his Motion indicated that some of these 
questions are not relevant. ... The statements made by [T.R.] concerning what Mr. Folk did is 
relevant as that is why this case is going forward." R Vol. I, p. 95-96. The State continued, "The 
Defendant also tries to argue admissibility of statements .... There is an argument for excited 
utterance and possible other exceptions to the hearsay rule. Mr. Folk does not understand that 
one may keep evidence out, but other rules let it in." R Vol. I, p. 96. (The State offered no 
citation for any case law that would allow irrelevant evidence to be admitted because, even 
though excludable under IRE 402, the evidence happened to be hearsay.) Id. 
In reply, Mr. Folk argued that the State was seeking admission of irrelevant evidence. 
He wrote: "As stated in the Defense motion, if it's not relevant foundation, it's improper 
evidence." R Vol. I, p. 100. 
Contrary to the State's argument on appeal, Mr. Folk did raise in the district court the 
issue of the relevance ofT.R.'s hearsay made after the nightmare and the issue is preserved for 
appeal. 
B. Admission of the Hearsay About the Content of the Nightmare was Improper 
The hearsay challenged by Mr. Folk is T.R. 's statement explaining the content of the 
nightmare: "[H]e told me it was about what that bad guy did to him the night before." "What 
bad guy?" "Jon, Jonathan." Trial Tr. p. 198, In. 1-5. 
The State argues that this hearsay was an excited utterance because the identification of 
Mr. Folk as a bad guy who did something to T.R. the night before was a spontaneous reaction to 
the nightmare. Respondent's Briefp. 7. But, that analysis is incomplete - the hearsay although 
prompted by the nightmare and discussing the content of the nightmare was about the events of 
the night before - not about the events of a few minutes before the statement was made. When 
the statement is analyzed in that light, as opposed to the State's erroneous interpretation that the 
statement was simply about and would simply be understood by the jury to be about the 
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nightmare and not Mr. Folk's identity as the bad guy who did something the night before, the 
statement is inadmissible as an excited utterance. State v. Field, 144 Idaho 559, 165 P.3d 273 
(2007). And, if the State's interpretation is correct and the statement was only about the 
nightmare and nothing more - not about Mr. Folk or an accusation against him, then the 
statement was clearly irrelevant - because the content of a nightmare does not have any tendency 
to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more 
probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence. IRE 401. A nightmare is just a 
nightmare. People dream all sorts of things for all sorts of reasons and dreams, let alone 
nightmares, do not reflect an accurate recounting of real events. As such, the content of dreams 
and nightmares are not relevant to ascertaining what happened in reality. 
Under either analysis, the district court abused its discretion in admitting the hearsay; the 
hearsay did not fall within the excited utterance exception and it was not relevant. 
C. The Error in Admission of the Hearsay was not Harmless Beyond a 
Reasonable Doubt 
The State has argued that the error in the admission of the hearsay was harmless beyond a 
reasonable doubt. State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 222, 245 P.3d 961,974 (2010) ("[T]he State 
shall have the burden of demonstrating that the error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.") 
Mr. Folk has set out in his Opening Brief a full analysis of the State's case and its 
weaknesses. Appellant's Opening Brief pp. 14-19. In light of those weaknesses, the State cannot 
carry its burden of demonstrating no harm beyond a reasonable doubt. 
D. Evidence of Prior Convictions was Improperly Admitted 
Mr. Folk set out in his Opening Brief how the district court erred in admitting evidence of 
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two prior convictions. The court had admitted the convictions to prove motive, opportunity, and 
intent. 
In his Opening Brief at pages 26-27, Mr. Folk set out why the prior convictions were not 
admissible to prove intent. The State does not make any argument in response on the question of 
intent. Rather, ir argues only that the priors were admissible to show opportunity and motive. 
Respondent's Briefpp. 12-15. This Court, for the reasons set out in Mr. Folk's Opening Brief, 
should accept the State's implicit concession of error and hold that the priors were not admissible 
to prove intent. 
In his Opening Brief, Mr. Folk also discussed that the prior offenses were probative of 
motive only insofar as the jury would draw the conclusion that because Mr. Folk had previously 
offended against boys, he was now motivated to commit a new offense against boys - an 
impermissible propensity use of the evidence. State v. Grist, 147 Idaho 49, 54, 205 P.3d 1185, 
1190 (2008); State v. Johnson, 148 Idaho 664, 668, 227 P.3d 918,922 (2010); State v. Joy, 155 
Idaho 1,8-9,304 P.3d 276,283-284 (2013). Appellant's Opening Briefp. 25. 
The State has not addressed how the prior offenses prove motive save to say that 
"because Folk's prior convictions involving D.P and M.P. show Folk accomplishing molestation 
under the guise of innocent childcare or in brief periods of time, they are relevant to show 
opportunity and motive in this case." Respondent's Briefp. 15. But, this is no more than 
impermissible propensity evidence - to say that the fact that someone did the same sort of crime 
before proves a motive to do it again is the essence of propensity. Therefore, the evidence of the 
prior convictions was inadmissible. Grist, supra; Johnson, supra; Joy, supra. 
The State relies upon State v. Gomez, 151 Idaho 146, 152,254 P.3d 47,53 (Ct. App. 
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2011), to argue that the prior convictions were also admissible to show opportunity. 
Respondent's Brief, pp. 12-15. In Gomez, the Court of Appeals held that evidence that Gomez 
had previously molested the victim, her sisters, and a friend of one of the sisters while in small 
living spaces accommodating up to 12 people, even while the girls were sleeping in beds with 
other siblings or their mother, was admissible to prove opportunity and credibility in a case 
wherein he was accused of touching the victim while she was asleep in a bed with her sixteen 
year old brother. 151 Idaho at 154,254 P.3d at 55. The Court held that the relevance of the 
evidence "was not only to Gomez's ability to access the room, but also his ability, in a house full 
of people, to surreptitiously enter V.B.'s bedroom, while she was sleeping next to her brother, to 
touch her and offer her money to sleep with him." The Court noted, "This testimony was 
necessary to explain how and why Gomez was able to abuse V.B. without anyone seeing the 
abuse, as her testimony, if considered alone, raised substantial questions as to how such abuse 
was possible in a house with little privacy." 151 Idaho at 155,254 P.3d at 56. 
Gomez is clearly distinguishable from Mr. Folk's case because the circumstances ofthe 
offense in Gomez were very unique - commission of lewd conduct while the victim was in bed 
with another person without the other person being aware of the offense. The allegations in Mr. 
Folk's case - touching a child quickly in the absence of any prior relationship with the child - did 
not involve unique circumstances. A very small sample of such cases includes: State v. 
Greensweig, 102 Idaho 794, 641 P.2d 340 (Ct. App. 1982) (luring passing girl into church); State 
v. Taylor, 122 Idaho 218,832 P.2d 1153 (Ct. App. 1992) (entering homes of strangers and 
touching children therein); State v. Bingham, 116 Idaho 415, 776 P.2d 424 (1989) (lewd conduct 
with girl who happened to walk by defendant's apartment); State v. Gratiot, 104 Idaho 782, 663 
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P .2d 1084 (1983) (touching girl who was walking near railroad tracks). Furthermore, the prior 
convictions evidence presented in Mr. Folk's trial involved the 1992 case wherein Mr. Folk was 
convicted following repeated contacts with a boy at a motel while caring for the boy with the 
parents' permission where both he and the boy's family were staying over an extended period of 
time and the 1999 case wherein Mr. Folk was convicted following a single contact with a 
previously unknown child in a laundromat. As the circumstances of the two prior offense were 
quite different from one another, the State cannot argue that the two together prove opportunity 
in the unique way the prior offenses proved opportunity in Gomez. 
In Gomez, the Court of Appeals also held that the evidence was relevant to prove the 
credibility of the complaining witness. However, insofar as Gomez holds that complaining 
witness credibility may be established by evidence of other bad acts of the defendant, it was 
wrongly decided and should be overruled. 
IRE 404(b) does not specifically allow proof of other crimes, wrongs, or acts to prove 
credibility. Rather the rule allows admission of prior bad acts evidence for purposes "such as" 
motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or 
accident. Credibility is not such a purpose. Credibility of the complaining witness is at issue in 
every trial. If prior bad acts are admissible to prove credibility of the complaining witness, then 
prior bad acts are always admissible and IRE 404(b) would not exist. Using other bad acts of the 
defendant to prove the complaining witness's credibility is simply using the other bad acts for 
purposes of propensity - if the defendant did it before, then the complaining witness's testimony 
that he did it again is more credible. 
Moreover, IRE 608 is a more specific rule that controls the admissibility of proof of the 
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character and conduct of a witness, including the witness's credibility. That rule only allows 
proof of specific instances of conduct of the witness, not someone else, for purposes of attacking 
or supporting the credibility of the witness and sets limitations on the proof used to establish 
those instances. IRE 608(b). See Ausman v. State, 124 Idaho 839, 841, 864 P.2d 1126, 1128 
(1993) ("A specific statute, and by analogy a specific rule of civil or criminal procedure, controls 
over a more general statute when there is any conflict between the two or when the general 
statute is vague or ambiguous.") 
Even if Gomez is not overruled, this Court should not accept the State's invitation to 
extend Gomez to hold that the prior offenses in this case were admissible to prove the credibility 
ofT.R. 
Lastly, the State has argued that the district court did not err in weighing the probative 
value of the two priors against the danger of unfair prejudice. Respondent's Briefpp. 15-16. 
The State argues: "Because the evidence was probative of opportunity, rather than for propensity 
alone, the danger of unfair prejudice is diminished." Respondent's Briefp. 15. 
There are three flaws in this argument. First, as discussed above, the prior bad acts did 
not prove opportunity. They were merely propensity evidence and as such their probative value 
was nil and the danger of unfair prejUdice was extremely high. 
Second, as discussed above, even if this Court was to find, contrary to all the case law 
involving similar cases, that touching a previously unknown child quickly is such a unique 
situation that "opportunity" is at issue per Gomez, only the 1999 conviction was relevant. The 
facts of the 1992 conviction involved a period of grooming, getting the parents' permission to be 
alone with the child, and repeated contacts. Even if the 1999 conviction was admissible, the 
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1992 conviction was not and the probative value of the 1999 conviction alone was clearly 
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice in the admission of both priors. 
Third, the State's argument does not address the error in the district court's analysis. As 
set out in Mr. Folk's Opening Briefp. 27, the district court concluded that the prejudice of the 
prior convictions was not great because Mr. Folk had admitted that he is a pedophile and that he 
wanted to change his behavior, but that he also still thinks about molesting children. R Vol. I p. 
181. In other words, the district court found that the prior convictions were not overly prejudicial 
because the jury already had evidence before it that would allow it to conclude - once a 
pedophile, always a pedophile - guilty of this charge. But, of course, that is the opposite 
conclusion from that which is allowed by the Rules of Evidence. Under the Rules of Evidence, 
propensity evidence is inadmissible. IRE 404(b). And, the State has pointed to no case law 
which holds that once some propensity evidence is in, more is not prejudicial. In fact, more is 
extremely prejudicial. Not every pedophile sexually abuses children. But, that is a distinction 
that can be extremely difficult for people to understand. Even if Mr. Folk's jury panel was able 
to understand and apply that distinction, the jurors would very quickly determine that Mr. Folk 
was not a pedophile who did not sexually abuse children when they heard evidence, from a 
victim and from a victim's mother accompanied by photographs of the victims as they appeared 
at the time that they became victims, that Mr. Folk had been criminally convicted twice before 
for sex acts against children. The jury would convict on propensity. The danger of unfair 
prejudice was extreme - not diminished. 
The district court erred both in finding the evidence of the prior convictions admissible 
under IRE 404(b) and in the balancing under IRE 403. Moreover, as set out in Mr. Folk's 
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Opening Brief, the State cannot demonstrate that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable 
doubt. Chapman, supra; Perry, supra; Coleman, supra. Therefore, the conviction should be 
reversed and a new trial granted. 
E. Cumulative Error Requires Reversal 
Mr. Folk has set out in his Opening Briefhow a new trial is required because of each of 
the errors individually. In addition, he has set out how reversal is required under the doctrine of 
cumulative error. He relies upon his argument at page 28 of his Opening Brief on this point. 
III. CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth in the Opening Brief and above, Mr. Folk asks that his 
conviction be reversed. 
Respectfully submitted thisci~~ay of November, 2013. 
Attorney for Jonathan Folk 
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